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Abstract— This paper describes the need and methods 
required to construct an integrated software verification and 
mission specification system for use in robotic missions 
intended for counter-weapons of mass destruction (c-WMD) 
operations, as part of a 3-year effort for the Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency. The overall system architecture is 
described. The principal tool for verification is a process 
algebra, PARS, based on port automata theory. PARS is 
introduced, emphasizing its ability to represent probabilistic 
programs and uncertain and dynamic environments, followed 
by the analysis of mission properties for an example robotic 
mission.   
Keywords; mobile robots, performance guarantees, formal 
properties, verification, robot programming. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In an ongoing project for the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency, we are developing methods to provide explicit 
performance guarantees for critical missions for autonomous 
and semi-autonomous robots.  These specifically focus on 
counter-weapons of mass destruction operations, such as 
might be encountered in search, containment, and/or 
neutralization of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, 
typically in urban indoor environments. Performance 
guarantees are essential for these missions as there may be 
only one opportunity to engage in the operation: failure may 
not be an option.  
Toward that end, the project’s goals include the design of 
a robotic software architecture that includes pre-mission 
performance analysis tools and methods for clearly 
presenting and confirming operator intention and acceptance 
of the mission, based on the level of success predicted and 
presented by said analysis.  The system architecture also will 
allow for iterative refinement prior to deployment to 
maximize the likelihood of success derived for feedback from 
the verification methods, and the opportunity for the operator 
to make a go-no go decision based on these results. This 
research builds on our previously developed and usability-
tested mission specification software system, MissionLab
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[22][24] and earlier research on performance guarantees for 
similar systems [20].  The overall intent is to provide highly 
reliable performance bounds for autonomous robots operating 
in uncertain environments, so that the robot can get it right 
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the first time. 
In Section II we review relevant literature as a basis for 
presenting our System Architecture in Section III and our 
Verification Model in Section IV. Verifying probabilistic 
robot programs has unique challenges, including handling 
real-valued variables representing durations, positions and 
velocities, and an environment replete with dynamic and 
concurrent activities as well as uncertainty. Arguing from the 
unique characteristics of robot computation, we propose a 
concept, the system period, to analyze this computationally 
complex problem. We introduce a process algebra to analyze 
the structure of the system of robot program and environment 
model to identify the system period. In Section V, we 
introduce our principal verification algorithms using a series 
of examples and conclude the paper with a summary and 
discussion in Section VI. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many robot software development frameworks exist today 
that can be potentially extended to include a verification 
component for the resulting robot program. Player/Stage is a 
robot programming environment developed at USC Robotics 
Research Lab [15]. Player was designed to be a robot device 
server that provides interface to a robot’s sensors and 
actuators via TCP sockets. Pyro, or Python Robotics, is a 
Python-based programming framework that allows users to 
write robot-independent programs [7]. The authors of Pryo 
intended to use it as a tool for teaching robotics at a higher 
level without the students worrying about low-level control. 
URBI, a Universal Robotic Body Interface, is a programming 
environment based on the client/server architecture [6]. 
Microsoft Robotics Studios (MSRS) is a programming 
environment for robot control based on Windows OS [17]. 
MSRS also has a powerful 3D physics simulator for robot 
controllers. MSRS includes a visual programming language 
(VPL) that is translated into C# code for compilation. ROS, 
or the Robotic Operating System, is a software development 
framework that provides operating system like functionality 
for robot devices [25]. The Common Control Language 
(CCL) provides a mission programming environment tailored 
for multiple autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) [11]. 
CCL addressed the main issues of communication and 
coordination among AUVs. We chose MissionLab [24][22] 
as the software infrastructure to build our mission verification 
tool upon because (1) it has a usability-tested [21][14] 
graphical programming interface where a user can create her 
program as visual, finite state automata (FSAs), and (2) the 
high-level FSA is translated to a dataflow language [23] that 
is compatible with the proposed verification algorithm.  
The automated verification problem for robot programs 
differs from the general automated verification problem 
addressed by the field of model checking [10][18] in several 
very important aspects. The behavior of a robot controlled 
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by a specific program will be different in different physical 
environments. Thus, we need to include a model of the 
environment as part of the verification problem. We 
represent the robot program as a process that communicates 
through its sensor and actuator processes with an 
environment process forming a single network of 
communicating processes as shown in Figure 1. In fact, for a 
realistic example, each of the processes shown in Figure 1 
will consist of hierarchically nested process networks. 
 
Figure 1: Program and Environment Network. 
 Discrete-Event Control (DEC) considers the analysis of a 
controller coupled to a plant model [26]. DEC approaches 
have been combined with model-checking software for the 
automated generation of higher-level robot controllers in 
[12][19]. While many of the techniques developed there can 
be applied to parts of our problem, we have to deal with the 
combined issues of representing real-valued variables 
concurrent activities and uncertainty. The variables may 
represent robot positions or velocities, or the duration or 
occurrence time of events, or the probability of a sensed 
feature or landmark. Concurrency is important to 
realistically represent the way the environment changes 
while the robot program is executing. The inclusion of 
uncertainty is important to handle the characterization of 
realistic environments as well as to probabilistic programs. 
Software verification captures the effect of computation as 
a trajectory in the state-space that is the Cartesian product of 
the value sets for all the variables in the program. The 
reachability of states in this space can be investigated, within 
the limits of computability and the inherent exponential 
nature of the space
2
, to determine whether a program will 
fail or succeed [10]. While tremendous progress has been 
made in this field [18], the additional variable, concurrency 
and uncertainty aspects that we add introduce combinatorial 
increases in the size of the combined state space of the 
program and environment system, rendering it prohibitively 
large to use reachability as a verification paradigm. A 
standard approach in the field is to search for regularities 
that can be leveraged to handle the state explosion, for 
example the assume-guarantee approach to modularizing a 
system, or the use of fairness conditions to eliminate 
undesirable states from analysis [18]. In Section IV we will 
introduce a regularity appropriate to robotics, the system 
period, leveraging the complexity reduction this allows. 
Our main tool will be process algebra [5][16]: a formal 
model of concurrent computation in which processes can be 
built from other processes using composition operators.  Our 
operators are similar to CSP operators but chosen for their 
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use in robot programs in particular. It does not include a 
built-in concept of optimization as does, e.g., the $-calculus 
algebra [13]. The algebraic properties of the composition 
operators allow process descriptions to be transformed to 
investigate issues such as process equivalence as well as 
issues of liveness, safety, and deadlock.  
In Section IV, we define a process algebra for robot 
programs that has an automaton semantics based heavily on 
our preliminary work in [20]. Certain reasoning is made 
simpler by this approach such as reasoning related to the 
periodic program structure and to the flow of variable values 
along communication channels. 
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The robotic software architecture is being built upon the 
MissionLab [22] robot programming environment. The goal 
of including a software verification component into the 
programming environment is to provide pre-mission 
performance analysis of the designed robot controller. The 
system architecture, Figure 2, supports three phases of the 
robot program development: design, verification, and 
execution. The design and verification phases plus the user 
form a robot program design loop that iterates until the 
mission-specific performance guarantee is satisfied or 
deemed unattainable. At this point, the operator can proceed 
to the execution phase with the confidence that the robot will 
meet the requisite mission requirements. 
 
Figure 2: Robotic Software System Architecture 
To illustrate the process of designing robot controllers, we 
step through the three development phases with a simple 
example: a controller for a robot to repeatedly go back and 
forth between two locations (A and B). This task, though 
simple, captures the main concept of a waypoint controller, 
and we will build on this in future work. The finite state 
automaton (FSA) of the back_and_forth robot is shown in 
Figure 3. While this example only uses one robot, our 
system design also supports programming and verification 
for multi-robot systems.  
A. The Design Phase 






for a robot to complete a given mission using CfgEdit 
(Configuration Editor), Figure 4. CfgEdit is the graphical 
visual programming interface frontend of MissionLab where 
the configuration of the robot program is constructed as an 
FSA. The configuration of the robot program is based on the 
Configuration Description Language (CDL), a specification 
language that supports recursive compositions of robot 
behaviors that are physical robot-independent [24][22].  
 
Figure 3: FSA for back_and_forth robot 
The FSA in Figure 4 implements the back_and_forth 
robot in Figure 3. The back_and_forth behavior consists of 
two primitive GoTo behaviors, which are provided within a 
library of primitive behaviors in MissionLab. More complex 
programs can be constructed from this library of primitive 
behaviors for more complicated missions (e.g., biohazard 
search within a building).  
 
Figure 4: CfgEdit example for back_and_forth robot 
To generate the C++ source code for the back_and_forth 
robot that can be compiled to control simulated or real 
robots, the CDL is first compiled into the Configuration 
Network Language (CNL) specification [23]. CNL specifies 
a robot program as a directed graph, where nodes represent 
primitive behaviors and edges represent dataflow links 
between behaviors. The CNL code is then compiled into 
C++ code. Finally, the C++ source code is compiled to 
generate robot executables for either simulation or mission 
execution using real robots.  
The operator can simulate the controller design in 
MissionLab to verify her design intent before running it on a 
real robot. However, to obtain any guarantee that the robot 
will successfully complete the required mission in the real 
world target environment, a formal verification step is 
necessary before robot deployment. Even for the  
back_and_forth mission, the slippage between the robot’s 
wheels and the floor in the real environment can cause the 
robot to fail the mission. One of the goals of the software 
verification system is to take into account the model of the 
environment (e.g., slippage) as well as noise and failure 
models of the sensors and actuators, and provide pre-mission 
performance analysis of the controller design.  
B. The Verification Phase 
One crucial aspect of verification of robot programs that is 
different from traditional software verification is that robots 
have to interact with real environments both from a sensing 
and an actuation perspective. Uncertainty about the world 
makes it difficult to predict the exact response of the robot, 
which makes formal verification of robot software a unique 
challenge. Nonetheless, formal verification is necessary for 
critical missions (e.g., c-WMD missions such as finding, 
containing, and neutralizing Chemical-Biological-Nuclear 
(CBN) weapons) where failure is not an option.  
The verification phase of the system design starts by 
translating the CNL specification of the robot program into 
the language required by the verification module, (see Fig. 
2). The verification language, called Process Algebra for 
Robot Schemas (PARS), is presented in the next section. We 
use CNL as the input to the verification module because the 
CNL specification of the robot program is similar to the port 
automata based Robot Schemas (RS) framework [20]. 
For pre-mission performance analysis of a robot, it is 
necessary for the verification module to take into account the 
mission performance criteria and models of both the robot 
hardware and the operating environment. Our system 
includes three pre-constructed model libraries for 
verification: the robot model library, sensor model library, 
and environment model library (Fig. 5-7). The operator can 
select from these libraries for different combinations of 
robot platforms, sensors, and environments to match the 
mission’s conditions. Similarly, for performance criteria, the 
operator is offered a selection of customizable criteria in 
terms of verification conditions and constraints.  
Based on the choices of verification constraints and 
robot, sensor, environment models, the verification module 
tests the combination of the robot software with the chosen 
constraints and models for specific properties of safeness, 
liveness, and/or efficiency. At the end of verification, the 
verifier provides the operator with performance guarantee 
information regarding the robot carrying out the required 
mission under the specified conditions. If the result is 
unsatisfactory (e.g., some verification constraints are 
violated), the operator can use the feedback from the verifier 
to iteratively refine the robot program. In other words, 
besides simply telling the operator “yes/no” that the robot 
program satisfies the specified performance criteria, the 
verifier also identifies potential causes of failure in the 
program and provides the operator with this useful 
information, to assist in mission completion enhancement. 
For the back_and_forth example, the operator can verify 
her robot controller by choosing a Pioneer robot with wheel 
encoders and noisy sonar sensors operating in an empty 
room with flat tiled floor and no obstacles. The operator can 
also specify a performance criterion such that the robot 
needs to be within 0.1 meters radius of each goal’s spatial 
location for that leg to be considered successful. Other 
mission constraints such as time (e.g., maximum round trip 








specified. The verifier then conducts a pre-mission analysis 
and generate a performance guarantee of whether the robot 
will successfully accomplish the mission with specified 
performance criteria. If the verifier found that the robot 
cannot complete the mission successfully because the 
maximum round trip time constraint is violated, it reports 
failure along with the violated constraint(s). With the this 
information, the operator can make new design choices: e.g., 
increase the robot’s speed or maximum round trip time.  
 
Figure 5: Notional example of robot model library 
 
Figure 6: Notional example of sensor model library 
 
Figure 7: Notional example of environment model library 
C. The Execution Phase 
The operator makes a go-no go decision based on the 
verification result. If a satisfactory performance guarantee is 
provided, she proceeds to the execution phase with 
confidence that the robot will successfully complete the 
mission. Executing the mission with MissionLab is 
straightforward [22][24]. The robot program executes on the 
robot directly or remotely from a base-station.  For more 
details on robot, environment, and sensor libraries, see [4]. 
IV. VERIFICATION MODEL 
This section (and the next) addresses the verification 
processing in Figure 2 in more detail. It begins by 
introducing a regularity that can be used to combat the 
exponential nature of the combined system state-space 
explained at the end of Section II. The process-algebra tool, 
PARS, we have developed to represent programs and 
environment is introduced. Examples of robot programs and 
environment models which illustrate use of real-value 
variables, concurrency and uncertainty are presented. We 
then show how tail-recursion in PARS can be used to 
represent and identify periodic behavior.  
A. The System Period 
To address the intractability of the combined system state-
space, we identify a program regularity unique to behavior-
based robotics, and we leverage this to modularize the 
verification problem.  A behavior-based robot interacting 
with its environment [2] will respond to a specific set of 
environmental affordances as programmed by its behaviors. 
In this situation, which we refer to as a behavioral state, 
because the robot continually responds to the fixed set of 
affordances, a periodic regularity is induced in the combined 
state-space. Once an affordance is responded to, the robot 
may return to this behavioral state or move to another that 
handles a different set of affordances. However, the essence 
of the behavioral state is this potential to repeatedly handle a 
specific set of affordances. We will analyze the combined 
program and environmental models to identify the periodic 
structure imposed by behavioral states. First, we introduce 
the algebraic framework in which we situate this problem. 
B. Verification language – PARS 
The process is our basic unit of program and environment 
model structure. The port automaton [27] (PA) model, 
extended slightly, will provide the semantics for a process. 
We formalize processes as automata, and communication 
connections between processes as ports. The PA model is 
compositional: a composite port connection automaton can 
be constructed for a set of communicating PA. We formalize 
the ways in which the automata can be composed to a port 
connection automaton as process algebra composition 
operations. Our structural analysis will be performed 
primarily at the more abstract, process algebra level and not 
at the more detailed, PA level.  
We will write a process P with initial parameter values 
u1,u2,… and which produces final result values v1,v2,… as: 
Pu1,u2,… v1,v2,… 
It is understood that this process refers to a timed PA: a PA 
augmented with a duration map and a partitioned set of end 
states, which is written as: 
P = ( Q, L, X, , , d, T, ,  ) where                               (1)                     
      Q  is the set of states 
      L   is the set of ports 
      X = ( Xi | i L ) is the event set for each port 
       : Q XL 2Q is the port transition function, 
.  .  . 
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  where XL= { (i, Xi) | i L } 
      d: Q  QT  is the timed transition function,  
  where dom(d)  proj1 dom() = 
       = (i | i L) i : Q  Xi output map for port i 
        2Q is the set of start states 
       2Q is the set of end states 
and where there are two mappings  
i (u1, u2, …)  =  0     
                  e (v1, v2, …)  =  0    
that relate the initial parameter values to the starting states, 
and the final result values to the end states of the PA. We 
partition the set of end states  into a set of stop end states 
+ and a set of abort end states - where a process that 
terminates in + is said to stop and a process that terminates 
in - is said to abort.  
A basic process corresponds to a PA defined using (1). 
All other processes are defined in terms of compositions of 
these processes. Examples of basic processes include: 
 Delayt  is a process that stops a duration t after it has been 
started;  
 Ranv is a process that stops and returns a random 
sample v from a distribution .  
 Incy and Outc,x are processes that perform input and 
output, respectively, on port c and then stop. 
 Eqa,b , Neqa,b , Gtra,b , etc., are processes that stop when 
a=b, ab, a>b, etc., respectively and abort otherwise. 
Non-basic processes are defined using composition 
operators, e.g.: 
T = Inc1x ; Outc2,x 
is process that inputs a value on port c1 and then outputs it 
on port c2. In our definition of sequential composition, if the 
first PA aborts (terminates in -) rather than stops, the port 
connection automaton aborts without proceeding to the 
second PA. Mapping this to a standard programming 
language such as C, this one operation implements both the 
sequence (‘;’) and the conditional (‘if’) operations. 
In concurrent composition, both PA execute at the same 
time. For example  
T =  Outc2,x  | Inc2x 
is a port connection of two PA, one that outputs a value on 
its port c2 and one that inputs a value from its port c2; we 
use here the simplification that similarly named input and 
output ports are connected to each other.  
A disabling composition of two processes is written  
T = P # Q 
and denotes a port connection automaton of P and Q 
connected so that whenever P terminates, it causes Q to 
terminate, and vice-versa. 
 Having developed the PARS notation sufficiently far, we 
now present some examples of its use for robot programs. 
C. Example Programs and Environments 
We continue the running example program BFa,b that moves 
the robot back and forth between two locations a and b 
specified in a global coordinates frame.  
BFa,b = MoveToa ; MoveTob ; BFa,b 
The MoveTo process moves the robot towards a location. Let 
the position of the robot be available on a port p and let the 
port v accept a velocity and then move the robot according to 
that velocity. We can write a very simple controller as: 
MoveTog = Inpr ; Neqr,g ; Outv, s(g-r) ; MoveTog 
where s(d) maps a position difference to an appropriate 
velocity vector, pulling the robot towards the goal using the 
potential field [2] approach until the goal is reached. 
In a simple model of the environment, the robot accepts 
the velocity on port v and instantly moves at that 
commanded velocity. The exact position of the robot at any 
time is available on port p, and the robot operates on flat, 
obstacle-free terrain: 
DEnvr     =  (Delayt  #  DOdor # Atr) ; Invu ; DEnvr+ut      (2) 
       DOdor     =  Outp,r ; DOdor                                                          
This DEnv model implements a discrete integral of velocity 
(with time granularity t) to generate position. The actual 
position of the robot, at any time, is represented by Atr. 
In a more realistic model, there will be noise associated 
with the sensors and actuators: 
NEnvr,q   = (Delayt  # NOdoq #Atr) ;                                      (3) 
                                (RanN(0,s1)e | Invu)  ;  NEnvr+(u+e) t , q+ut  
        NOdoq    = RanN(0,s2)e ; Outp,q+e ; NOdoq 
Here, the velocity that the robot acts on is the command 
velocity u contaminated with a zero-mean normal error e. 
The position that the robot reads from its odometry on port p 
is the actual position contaminated with a zero mean normal 
error.  See [20] for other kinds of noise models, including 
terrain slip, in a similar process algebra framework. 
We can also model static obstacles by modifying the 
environment dynamics so that if the robot tries to move 
through an obstacle, it collides with the obstacle and remains 
stuck. 
Obsq     = Outb,q ; Obsq                                                               (4) 
       OEnvr   = (Delayt  # Odor #Atr) ; (Invu | Inbq) ; 
                             ( Neqq,r+ut ; Set r+ut nq  |  
                                Eqq,r+ut   ; Set q+e   nq  ) ; OEnvnq 
Here, Set rq  is a basic process that just sets output q=r. 
The semantics of PARS allows for a rich description of 
process delays and probabilistic functionality. Stochastic 
properties that can be modeled include probabilistically 
delayed enabling/disabling, and synchronization as well as 
random variable values. The dynamic arrival of an object is 
captured by ObsGen (for   ~ Exp()): 
       ObsGen = Ran

x ; Delayx ; Obj 
Probabilistically delayed arrival and termination, for example 
the existence and duration of difficult terrain patches in an 
uncertain environment, can be captured as: 




d) ; Delayt ; (Delayd # Rough) . 
Where   ~ Exp() and   ~ N(,) (a combination referred 
to as a severity [28]). This framework can represent 
previously unseen or unknown objects and events, and the 
adaptive/learning algorithms to handle them, as long as the 
potential for these events is written in the form above. 
We will now look at how periodic behavior, as described in 
subsection A, can be represented and identified in PARS. 
  
D. Recursive Processes 
The tail-recursive (TR) expression: 
T = P ; T 
describes a process that repeats P continually until it aborts. 
The semantics of a TR process is a port connection 
automaton that implements such a loop; an efficient 
‘implementation’ of recursion. Mapping to a standard 
programming language such as C, this implements a ‘while’ 
loop. Boem and Jacopini [8] established that any language 
that implements sequence, condition and loop constructs is, 
in fact, sufficient to represent any program. 
For convenience, the following notation is used for 
sequential compositions: 
Pn = Pn-1 ; P and P1 = P 
This allows us to ‘unroll’ a TR process: 
                                        T = P ; T = Pn ; T   n>0                                  (5) 
We can interpret T as a process that goes through multiple 
instances of the same computation, P. That is, P is the 
periodic aspect of T. As it stands however, this iteration is 
history-less. We can include history if we add parameters: 
              Tu = Pu ; Tf(u) =      ( )
     ( )     n>0,  f 0(u)=u           (6) 
T offers a repeated interaction with its environment, but now 
the effect of previous events after the ith iteration is captured 
by the sequence of values of f 
i
(u). In the case that P can 
terminate with abort as well as stop, because of the 
conditional nature of the sequential composition, we get  
                           Tu = Pu ; Tf(u) =      ( )
     n>0                                (7) 
We will refer to f as a parameter-flow function: a mapping 
f : ⅅm →  ⅅm  that relates the values of m parameters in the 
nth and (n+1)th iterations of the period P. The use of flow 
functions allows us to handle the issue of real-valued 
variables (ⅅ = ℝ) transformed by processes, and this feature 
is one of the principal motivations in using tail recursion as a  
loop construct. 
 
Verification Approach: The period and parameter flow 
function associated with a TR process are a concise 
implicit representation of the entire state-space of the 
process and offer an alternative to explicit state 
enumeration. 
E. Identifying the System Period 
When we analyze a robot program operating in a given 
environment, we analyze a concurrent, communicating 
composition of the program and the environment (Fig. 1).  If 
we have a set of TR process equations P1, P2, …, Pm that 
form a system Sys through concurrent composition: 
Sys = P1 | P2 | …| Pm 
then an important question is, can this Sys be rewritten in a 
TR form? That is, under what conditions can we develop an 
expression for the period of the system in terms of the 
periods of its component processes?   
For a TR definition of process P, the section of the 
process definition between the equal sign and the tail-
recursion will be called the period P’ 
P = P’   P 
If the component periods P1’, P2’, …, Pm’ contain port 
communication, then those interactions sequence the 
component periods with respect to one another, forcing a 
partial sequence of computations. In the case that all ports’ 
communications can be matched, input to output, across the 
component periods, then a system period can be identified: 
Sys = Sys’   Sys 
Sys’ = F(P1’, P2’, …, Pm’) 
Where F(.) is a process composition obtained by matching 
the port communications in component periods. It may be 
necessary to unroll shorter component periods one or more 
times using results (5) & (6) to provide sufficient port 
communications for a longer component period (longer and 
shorter in this context refer to the number of port 
communication operations).   
F. Implications and Computational Complexity 
What is the practical implication of assuming that a system 
period exists for the combination of robot program and 
environment model? A system period will not exist in the 
cases that: 
 the processes don’t communicate with each other; 
 port communications are unmatched; 
 an infinite sequence of unrollings is needed. 
With respect to the first case, a robot program that does 
not actually interact with its environment can never achieve 
any level of performance! This is a major error that should 
be flagged. In the second case, unmatched communications 
means that some part of the robot program will block 
forever, a potential deadlock case that also needs to be 
flagged to the attention of the designer. 
Finally, an infinite sequence of unrollings is evidence of 
a lack of periodic behavior. However, MissionLab’s FSA 
program model is based on the kind of behavioral states 
mentioned in subsection A.  
The computational complexity of calculating the system 
period relies on the complexity of the matching process. If 
no explicit fan-in or fan-out is allowed, then the 
computational complexity is O(n
2
) where n is the number of 
input processes in the (final, unrolled) system.  
V. VERIFICATION ALGORITHMS 
Here we present by example our approach to the analysis of 
the system period to determine if a robot program achieves a 
performance guarantee in an environment. 
A. Task Completion 
A designer may wish to know if a specified system completes 
a task (liveness). In our approach, both the system and 
property to be verified are specified in PARS. The two 
process networks are compared and analyzed, and if the 
specified system can be shown equivalent to the property, we 
report success (cf. [1],[9]). For example, the designer may 
wish to know if the robot arrives and stays in position a after 
time t1. We can specify this verification property using 
PARS as: 
Goal = Delayt1 ; (Delayt2 #Ata ); Delayt3 ; Goal 
This states that the robot will be at position a after time t1 
and remain there at least a subsequent time t2. Notice that t1, 
  
t2 and t3 are variables not constants. A property specification 
process network differs from a process network in that it is 
actually a process network constraint expression, a 
specification of a set of possible networks. 
Consider the deterministic environment model DEnv from 
(2) for the BF program.  The system in this case is 
Sys = DEnvp0 | BFa,b 
The first step in our verification approach is to find the 
system period from the component periods: 
BF’a,b        =  MoveToa ; MoveTob  
MoveTo’g =  Inpr ; Neqr,g ; Outv,  s(g-r)  
DEnv’r   =  (Delayt # Odor #Atr) ; Invu 
The parameter flow functions (that link variables values in 
the n
th
 iteration to those in the n+1
th
 iteration) are: 
BF’a,b     fBF(a,b)     = (a,b) 
       MoveTo’g   fMoveTo(g)  = g 
       DEnv’r    fDEnv(r)      = r+ut 
The only port constraints between the environment and the 
program are input on port p and the output on port v. The 
period of DEnv must be unrolled n times to match the first 
part of BF. To match the second part of BF we need to unroll 
DEnv again, yielding: 
Sys   = Sys p r; Sysr        
      Sys p = (       ( ))
n ;  (     
     ( )
 )m   
      Sys1p =         | MoveToa  
To generate the parameter flow function f for Sys1, we need 
to propagate values across the port connections between 
DEnv’ and MoveTo’. We can associate a set of recurrence 
relations with the system flow functions:  
  Flow Function            Recurrence 
                     fSys1(r) = r + s(g - r)t   rn+1=rn+s(gn - rn)t 
                    fMoveTo(g)  = g         gn+1=gn 
If we project () the network onto the processes in the 
property specification network, and if we reasonably assert 
that Delaytn = Delaynt  then we have: 
Sys’  {Delay, At} =  
        Delay(n-1)t ; ( Delayt #     ( ) ) ;  
        Delay(m-1)t ;( Delayt #       ( )  ) 
We need to find a structural mapping between the Sys’ and 
Goal’ networks. In this case, structural mapping is trivial: 
Delay(n-1)t ; (Delayt #      ( ) ) ;  
            Delay(m-1)t ;( Delayt #        ( )  ) =  
               Delayt1 ; (Delayt2 # Ata ); Delayt3  
To complete the mapping, the flow recurrences need to be 
solved for n and m for which f 
n
(p0)=a in which case t1=(n-
1)t and t2=mt.  
The automatic construction of system flow functions 
requires tracing a variable through a system period. The 
complexity is linear in the length of the period. It also 
requires substituting values communicated via port 
connections. This is linear in the number of concurrent 
processes in the period. We use existing tools (e.g. PURRS
3
) 




B. Task Safety 
A safety property states that “bad things” won't happen. We 
analyze the system period to make sure that the safety 
property is something that is always addressed by the 
program. Once again, we will use algebraic equivalence 
relations to re-structure the network, and map this re-
structured network to the property to be verified. 
Consider the BF program for the environment model (4) 
that includes obstacles, OEnv. A safety property in this 
example would be obstacle avoidance: The robot is never 
within 1m of an obstacle. As a process network, this is: 
G = (Odop | Obsp+q) ; G where  q > 1 
We analyze the network consisting of an obstacle at location 
d with BFa,b : 
Sys = Obsd | OEnvp,0 | BFa,b 
As before, we obtain the periods of each component process  
and construct the system period.  
    BF’a,b       =  MoveToa ; MoveTob  
    MoveTo’g =  Inpr ; Neqr,g ; Outv,  s(g-r)  
     Obs’q       =  Outb,q  
     OEnv’r    =  (Delayt # Odor #Atr) ; (Invu | Inbq) ; 
                                  (Neqq,r+ut ; Set r+ut nq  | Eqq,r+ut   ; Set q+e nq )   
Since the system period must always satisfy the safety 
property, the first step is a connectivity check. Starting at 
Odo and at Obs (the processes in the safety property) we 
follow the port and variable value connections, dividing the 
system period network into equivalence classes of processes. 
Unless Odo and at Obs fall into the same class, there is no 
way to guarantee the safety property. In this case, since there 
is no connection from the obstacle process to any part of the 
BF network, the safety property fails. 
       To address the safety property, we need to introduce a 
sensor that can report on the object location: 
Sensorc = (Inbq  |  Inpr) ;  Gtr|r-q|,c ; Outspq ; Sensorc 
This sensor accurately reports on the location of the obstacle 
as long as it is less than c from the robot. Modifying BF: 
MoveTog = ( Inpr | Inspq )  ; Neqr,g  ;  
( Gtr|r-q|,h ; Outv, s(g-r)  | 
   Lte|r-q|,h ; Outv, s(r-q)  ) ; MoveTog 
If the obstacle is within a distance h >c the robot will stop 
moving towards the goal (velocity s(g-r)) and instead move 
away from the obstacle. Because of the additional 
connectivity to the Sensorc process, on examination of the 
period of the system, we see that Odo and Obs fall into the 
same equivalence class. We have to verify that the 
parameters to Odo and Obs satisfy the safety property. We 
construct the system period flow function as before, 
projecting the system period onto the goal process network, 
yielding: 
     ( ) =    
        (   )
        (   )
   
We can match the safety property network if h > 1, and 
hence verifying the safety property. 
C. Stochastic properties 
Now we consider a verification example that includes 
uncertain environment.  The specification goal will be: The 
  
robot arrives to position a within 10t time units at least 90% 
of the time. This can be specified in PARS as:  
Goal = Ran x ; Delayt ; Ata , 
where  is a distribution such that P( x ≤ 10t ) ≥ 90%.  
Consider the non-deterministic environment model NEnv 
in (3). When we analyze the system (NEnv | MoveTo), we now 
get the recurrence relation: 
rn+1 = rn + (un + en) ,  
where     ( ,  
 ) is a normally distributed random 
variable. To handle uncertainty, we need to move from the 
case of variables with a single value to variables with a 
distribution of values. The domain ⅅm of the flow function 
now becomes distributions and the recurrence becomes 
rn+1 = rn * ( un   )  
Where  =  ( ,   ) and * denotes convolution. If we 
simplify our environment models to capture uncertainty and 
noise with just normal distributions, or mixtures of normal 
distributions, this expression can be solved efficiently. The 
sum of normal distributions is also normal  ( ,    )  
If we include Poisson processes in our environment, to 
model arrival times, then we will need to also allow for 
exponential-normal interaction. A very important example of 
this is the severity terrain model that we presented at the end 
of section IV.C. In terms of the recurrence relation above, 
this would mean that in addition to     ( ,  
 ) the solution 
n ~ Exp(). A form for the severity distribution is developed 
in [28] by Yang and Nadarajah. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
This paper addresses the pressing need to be able to verify 
mission-critical robotic software in the context of its 
environment and specific physical hardware (sensors and 
actuators) with the goal of providing performance guarantees 
to an operator prior to their sending a robot into a potentially 
hazardous situation. To do so we have developed a software 
architecture that provides visual programming capabilities 
and an internal language that is amenable to such analysis. 
    To verify mission critical robot programs, we need to 
analyze a combination of program and environment model, 
each of which contains real valued variables, concurrent 
activities and uncertainty. A unique regularity of behavior-
based robot computation, the system period, is introduced to 
render this complex problem more tractable. A process 
algebra, PARS, is introduced to represent and analyze 
programs and their environments. The expressiveness of 
PARS for both deterministic and stochastic processes, as 
well as the proposed verification approach, is illustrated on a 
simple back and forth robotic mission.  
     We are currently in the first year of a 3-year program to 
develop and integrate the existing software and incorporate 
the new ideas described herein.  We anticipate the final 
system to be able to operate in a range of environments, 
using multiple types of hardware platforms, specified over 
teams of robots. 
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